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Figure 1 (Waterfall & Edelman). Examples of child-directed 
speech in six languages. It is not necessary to be able to read, 
let alone understand, any of these languages to identify the most 
prominent structural characteristics common to these examples 
(see text for a hint). These characteristics should, therefore, be 
readily apparent to a prelinguistic infant, which is indeed the 
case, as the evidence we mention suggests. All the examples 
are from CHILDES corpora (MacWhinney 2000). 
speech, phrase structure, and other structural “universals.” In 
other words, certain forms may be common across languages 
because they are easier to learn, given the algorithmic constraints 
on the learner.1 
Language acquisition becomes easier not only when linguistic 
forms match the algorithmic capabilities of the learner, but also 
when the learner’s social environment is structured in various 
helpful ways. One possibility here is for mature speakers to 
embed structural cues in child-directed speech (CDS). Indeed, 
a growing body of evidence suggests that language acquisition is 
made easier than it would have been otherwise because of the 
way CDS is shaped by caregivers during their interaction with chil-
dren.2 One seemingly universal property of CDS is the prevalence 
of variation sets (Hoff-Ginsberg 1990; Ku¨  ntay & Slobin 1996; 
Waterfall 2006; under review) – partial alignment among 
phrases uttered in temporal proximity, of the kind illustrated in 
Figure 1. The proportion of CDS utterances contained in variation 
sets is surprisingly constant across languages: 22% in Mandarin, 
20% in Turkish, and 25% in English (when variation sets are 
defined by requiring consecutive caregiver utterances to have in 
common at least two lexical items in the same order; cf. Ku¨ntay 
& Slobin 1996; this proportion grows to about 50% if a gap of 
two utterances is allowed between the partially matching ones). 
Furthermore, the lexical items (types) on which CDS utterances 
are aligned constitute a significant proportion of the corpus voca-
bulary, ranging from 9% in Mandarin to 32% in English. 
Crucially, the nouns and verbs in variation sets in CDS were 
shown to be related to children’s verb and noun use at the 
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same observation, as well as to their production of verbs, pro-
nouns, and subcategorization frames four months later (Hoff-
Ginsberg, 1990; Waterfall 2006; under review). Moreover, exper-
iments involving artificial language learning highlighted the 
causal role of variation sets: adults exposed to input which con-
tained variation sets performed better in word segmentation 
and phrase boundary judgment tasks than a control group that 
heard the same utterances in a scrambled order, which had no 
variation sets (Onnis et al. 2008). 
The convergence of the three lines of evidence mentioned – 
the ubiquity of variation sets in child-directed speech in widely 
different languages, their proven effectiveness in facilitating 
acquisition, and the algorithmic revival of the principles of acqui-
sition intuited by Harris – supports E&L’s proposal of the origin 
of observed universals. More research is needed to integrate the 
computational framework outlined here with models of social 
interaction during acquisition and with neurobiological 
constraints on learning that undoubtedly contribute to the emer-
gence of cognitive/cultural language universals. 
NOTES 
1. Language may also be expected to evolve in the direction of a better 
fit between its structure and the learners’ abilities (Christiansen & Chater 
2008). 
2. Social cues complement and reinforce structural ones in this 
context (Goldstein & Schwade 2008). 
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Abstract: Our response takes advantage of the wide-rangin 
commentary to clarify some aspects of our original proposa 
and augment others. We argue against the generative critics o 
our coevolutionary program for the language sciences, defen 
the use of close-to-surface models as minimizing cross 
linguistic data distortion, and stress the growing role o 
stochastic simulations in making generalized historical account 
testable. These methods lead the search for general principle 
away from idealized representations and towards selectiv 
processes. Putting cultural evolution central in understandin 
language diversity makes learning fundamental in the cognitio 
of language: increasingly powerful models of general learning 
paired with channelled caregiver input, seem set to manag 
language acquisition without recourse to any innate “universa 
grammar.” Understanding why human language has no clea 
parallels in the animal world requires a cross-specie 
perspective: crucial ingredients are vocal learning (for whic 
there are clear non-primate parallels) and an intention 
attributing cognitive infrastructure that provides a universa 
base for language evolution. We conclude by situating linguisti 
diversity within a broader trend towards understanding huma 
cognition through the study of variation in, for example, human 
genetics, neurocognition, and psycholinguistic processing. 
R1. Introduction 
The purpose of our target article was to draw attention to 
linguistic diversity and its implications for theories of 
human cognition: Structural diversity at every level is not 
consonant with a theory of fixed innate language structure, 
but instead suggests remarkable cognitive plasticity and 
powerful learning mechanisms. We pointed out that 
human communication is the only animal communication 
system that varies in myriad ways in both form and 
meaning across the species, and this must be a central 
fact that should never be lost sight of. 
The responses in the commentaries show that opinion in 
the language sciences, and especially in linguistics, is still 
sharply divided on “the myth of language universals,” or 
at least our telling of it. The comments of the typological 
and functional linguists (Croft, Goldberg, Haspelmath) 
show that much of our argument is already widely 
accepted there: “evolutionary linguistics is already here” 
(Croft). Positive responses from many commentators in 
experimental and cross-species comparative psychology 
suggest that researchers in experimental psychology and 
cross-species studies of communication are ready for the 
kind of coevolutionary, variability-centred approach we 
outlined (Bavin, Catania, McMurray & Wasserman, 
Merker, Tomasello, and Waterfall & Edelman). Gen-
erative linguists, by contrast, disagreed sharply with our 
presentation, laying bare some fundamental differences 
in how linguistics is conceived as a science.1 
We have organized the response as follows. 
Section R2 responds to the critical comments from the 
generative camp, suggesting that the assumptions 
behind many of these responses are misplaced. 
Section R3 looks at the question of whether we have over-
stated the range of diversity by ignoring unpopulated 
regions of the design space. 
Section R4 takes the commentaries from the non-genera-
tive linguists and the psychological, animal behavior, 
and computational learning research communities, 
which were overwhelmingly positive, and indicates 
how these might be used to round out, or in places 
correct, our position. 
Section R5 sketches where we think these new develop-
ments are heading, and their relationship to what else 
is happening in the cognitive sciences. 
We set aside the specific data questions till an appendix 
at the end, where we concede two factual mistakes, clarify 
disputed facts and generalizations, and examine more 
specific linguistic points that would bog down the main 
argument – on nearly all of them, we think the criticisms 
from our generativist colleagues do not stand up to 
scrutiny. 
R2. Incompatible evaluation metrics reflect 
different paradigms 
It was never our intention to engage in mud-slinging with 
our generative colleagues, but as Tomasello has predicted 
there was a certain inevitability that familiar sibling quar-
rels would be rerun. Most of the criticisms from the gen-
erative camp reflect deep differences between generative 
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and typological/functionalist approaches in their overall 
assumptions about many issues. Where do we locate 
causal explanations? Where do we seek the general unify-
ing laws behind surface diversity – in structure or in 
process? Do we use only discrete mathematical models 
(favoring regularized representations), or do we bring in 
continuous and stochastic models as well (favoring rep-
resentations sticking closer to surface variety)? Should 
generalizations purport to directly represent mental 
reality, or are they modelling the summed information of 
thousands of different coevolutionary products shaped 
by multiple selective factors? Should we adopt essentiali-
zing categorizations (as “formal universals”), or abandon 
these as misleading and adopt a strategy that measures 
surface diversity directly so as not to lose data that is 
useful for evaluating the fit of models? 
Generative and typological/functionalist accounts will 
give different answers to each of these questions, and it 
is this difference in overall scientific paradigm that 
accounts for the seemingly irreconcilable conflict 
between generativist commentators like Freidin and 
Pesetsky, who see our proposals as so imprecise as to be 
unfalsifiable, and psychologists like Tomasello and Mar-
goliash & Nusbaum, for whom it is the generative 
approach that has moved away from falsifiability. 
To clarify these differences, we try here to give a brief 
and constructive account of where the real differences 
lie (as Pullum & Scholz opine, more could be fruitless). 
The generativist critique includes the following interlinked 
charges: 
1. Lack of theory, precise representation, or falsifiabil-
ity (Smolensky & Dupoux, Freidin) 
2. Mistaken ontology, mistaking behavior for cognition 
and (a point we hold off till sect. R4.1) history for 
science (Smolensky & Dupoux) 
3. Lack of abstractness – that we are misled by surface 
variation into ignoring underlying structural regularities 
(Baker, Harbour) 
4. That taking surface diversity at face value leads away 
from the quest for general principles (Smolensky & 
Dupoux, Nevins) 
5. That we have neglected the presence of “formal uni-
versals” (Nevins) 
6. That the typologists’ preference for using a non-
abstract descriptive apparatus is the wrong methodological 
choice (Rizzi) 
7. That we have merely presented an under-analyzed 
Wunderkammer of variation that can be shown to reduce 
to well-known phenomena (Pesetsky). 
We now take up these issues one at a time. A further cri-
ticism, that we may have overstated the range of diversity 
by ignoring the fact that languages all lie within a bounded 
corner of the possibility space (Pinker & Jackendoff, 
Tallerman) is dealt with separately in section R3. 
R.2.1. What kind of theory? 
Smolensky & Dupoux and Freidin complain that we did 
not offer a fully articulated theory with precise predictions 
about sentential structure. But that was not what we set 
out to do. Our goal was to survey our current understand-
ing of language variation, explain its import for the cogni-
tive sciences, and outline a fertile area for future research. 
We sketched the kind of biological models into which this 
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:5 473 
Response/Evans & Levinson: The myth of language unive 
variation neatly seems to fit and the ones that invite future 
development in a number of directions. A lot of these 
materials and ideas have not been sufficiently taken into 
account, we felt, by researchers in the cognitive sciences. 
We were gently suggesting that the time has come for a 
paradigm change, and at the end of this response we will 
say a little more. 
Nevertheless, at the end of the target article we did 
sketch directions for future research (see also sect. R5 in 
this response). Commentators outside the generative 
camp (e.g., Waterfall & Edelman, Christiansen & 
Chater) in many cases saw no difficulty in deriving a 
range of predictions or consequences, and indeed saw 
the target article as “mov[ing] the study of language in 
the direction of the research methods of the experimental 
sciences and away from enclosed personal belief systems” 
(Margoliash & Nusbaum). 
The radically different assessments of empirical ground-
ing here reflect (we think) a narrow view of theory and 
evidence on the part of some of our critics. Within 
the language sciences there is a wide variety of theory – the-
ories about language change (historical linguistics), language 
usage (pragmatics), microvariation within individual 
languages (sociolinguistics), language production, acqui-
sition and comprehension (psycholinguistics), language vari-
ation (typology), and language structure (the traditional 
heart of linguistics), to name just a few. Generative theory 
is just one version of a theory of linguistic structure and rep-
resentation, and it is marked by a lack of external explana-
tory variables, making no reference to function, use, or 
psychological or neural implementation. It has delivered 
important insights into linguistic complexity, but has now 
run into severely diminishing returns. It is time to look at 
the larger context and develop theories that are more 
responsive to “external” constraints, be they anatomical 
and neural, cognitive, functional, cultural, or historical. 
Here we think an evolutionary framework has a great deal 
to offer in the multiple directions we sketched. 
We pointed out the central fact that the human com-
munication system is characterized by a diversity in form 
and meaning that has no parallel in the animal kingdom. 
Generative theory has never come fully to terms with 
this, and a theory of universal grammar that isn’t answer-
able to linguistic variation consequently has distinctly 
limited appeal. 
R.2.2. Cognition, behavior, and representation 
Various Chomskyan dichotomies (competence vs. per-
formance, i-language vs. e-language, Smolensky & 
Dupoux’s cog-universals vs. des-universals) have been 
used to drive a wedge between cognition and behavior. 
There are distinct dangers in this. 
First, most cognitive scientists will agree that cognition 
exists to service perception and behavior. Second, the evi-
dence for cognition remains behavioral and perceptual 
(even when we can look at the functioning brain in vivo, 
we look at its response to an event), and most cognitive 
scientists will want all theories measured ultimately in 
terms of predictions over brain events and behavior or 
response (as the very title of this journal suggests; cf. Mar-
goliash & Nusbaum). Third, many cognitive scientists 
view favorably the new “embodiment” perspectives 
which blur the line between representation and process. 
Chomsky, in his initial work on formal grammars, 
suggested that the descriptive apparatus chosen to model 
language should be just sufficient and not more powerful 
than is required – in that way, some match to cognition 
may be achieved. From then on, in the generative tradition 
there has been a systematic conflation between the 
language of description and what is attributed to the 
language learner and user: “the brains of all speakers rep-
resent a shared set of grammatical categories” (Berent), 
and “formal universals in phonology are constituted by 
the analytic elements that human minds employ in con-
structing representations of sound structure” (Nevins). 
Many generativist approaches – particularly parametric 
formulations – consequently attribute cognitive reality to 
conditionals of the form “if structural decision X, then 
also structural decision Y” or “learning X is universally 
easier than learning Y” (essentially Nevins’ Example 
[1]). No language typologist would maintain that con-
ditional regularities of this type would be found in speak-
ers’ heads. Yet this is precisely what is advocated in the OT 
(Optimality Theory) framework advocated by Smolensky 
& Dupoux: 
OT . . . is inherently typological: the grammar of one language 
inevitably incorporates claims about the grammars of all 
languages. This joining of the individual and the universal, 
which OT accomplishes through ranking permutation, is prob-
ably the most important insight of the theory. (McCarthy 2002, 
p. 1) 
To make this work, an infinite set of possible sentences 
are first generated then filtered by (among other things) 
comparisons of this type. Instead of putting the filtering 
where it belongs, in cultural system evolution across gen-
erations, OT effectively burdens each individual mind 
with a pre´cis of the functional history of all known 
human languages, and loads the entire optimization 
process onto on-line grammatical computation. This is 
not just cognitively unrealistic – it is computationally 
intractable (Idsardi 2006). 
This conflation of the metalanguage with the object of 
description is a peculiar trick of the generative tradition. 
By going down this path, it has opened up a huge gap 
between theory and the behavioral data that would 
verify it. The complex representational structures look 
undermotivated, and covert processes proliferate where 
alternative models deftly avoid them (see the discussion 
of Subjacency and covert movement in sect. R6.8). 
A biologist does not assume that a snail maintains an 
internalized representation of the mathematical equations 
that describe the helical growth of its shell. Even for the 
internal characterization of a mental faculty, the strategy 
is odd: computer scientists interested in characterizing 
the properties of programming languages use a more 
general auxiliary language to describe them, as in Scott-
Strachey denotational semantics. Once explanatory 
theories hook external factors (e.g., psycholinguistic or 
evolutionary factors) into the account, this conflation of 
cognition and metalanguage must be dropped. 
Smolensky & Dupoux’s aphorism “Generative 
grammar merits a central place in cognitive science 
because its topic is cognition and its method is science,” 
then, will not find universal approval: other branches of 
linguistics are much more in tune with psychological 
reality as reflected in language acquisition, production, 
and comprehension. Nor has generative grammar of the 
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Chomskyan variety been particularly successful as an 
explicit theory of linguistic representation. Many other 
representational formats, such as HPSG and LFG, have 
had greater uptake in computational circles (see, e.g., 
Butt et al. 2006, Reuer 2004). LFG, for example, adopts 
a parallel constraint-based architecture that includes 
dependency as well as constituency relations. This allows 
for the direct representation of crucial types of variability 
discussed in sect. 5 of our target article, while avoiding the 
need for movement rules or large numbers of empty nodes 
(see sect. R6.8 for further discussion of how this works for 
subjacency). These formats, which represent different out-
growths from the same generative roots, show that precise, 
testable, computationally tractable models of language can 
be developed that reflect cross-linguistic diversity much 
more directly in their architecture. 
R2.3. Abstractness and universal generalizations 
A number of commentators (Baker, Harbour, Nevins, 
Pesetsky) felt that we were unwilling to entertain the 
sorts of abstract analyses which allow us to find unity in 
diversity. But we are simply pointing out that the proposals 
on the table haven’t worked. Abstractness has a cost: the 
more unverifiable unobservables, the greater the explana-
tory payoff we expect. Judging the point where explanatory 
superstructure becomes epicyclic and unproductive may 
be tough, and generative and non-generative camps 
clearly have different thresholds here. But the increasingly 
abstruse theoretical apparatus is like a spiralling loan that 
risks never being paid by the theory’s meagre empirical 
income (cf. Edelman & Christiansen 2003). Even attempts 
to deal with the growing evidence of variability through 
the theory of parameters – projecting out diversity by a 
limited number of “switches” pre-provided in Universal 
Grammar (UG) – has empirically collapsed (Newmeyer 
2004, p. 545), a point largely undisputed by our commen-
tators (although Rizzi continues to use the notion – see 
the discussion of Subjacency in sect. R6.8). 
All sciences search for underlying regularities – that’s 
the game, and there is no branch of linguistics (least of 
all historical linguistics, with its laws of sound change) 
that is not a player. For this reason Harbour’s commen-
tary misses the target – of course some middle level gen-
eralizations about the semantics of grammatical number 
are valid in any framework (although his account of the 
plural seems to not generalize beyond three participants, 
and there are additional problems that we discuss in 
sect. R6.4). The art is to find the highest level generaliz-
ation that still has empirical “bite.” 
R2.4. Recognizing structural diversity is not 
incompatible with seeking general laws 
The criticisms by Nevins, Pesetsky, and Smolensky & 
Dupoux – that we are not interested in seeking deeper 
laws behind the surface variation in linguistic structure – 
reveal a failure to understand the typological/functional 
approach. In a coevolutionary model the underlying regu-
larities in the cross-linguistic landscape are sought in the 
vocal-auditory, cognitive, sociolinguistic, functional, and 
acquisitional selectors which favor the development of 
some structures over others. The goal is to seek a con-
strained set of motivated selectors (each testable) that 
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filter what structures can be learned, processed, and trans-
mitted. The stochastic nature of the selection process, and 
the interaction and competition between multiple selec-
tors, accounts for the characteristic balance we find, of 
recurrent but not universal patterns with marked diversity 
in the outliers. 
Phonological structures, for example, will be favored to 
the extent that they can be easily said, easily heard, and 
easily learned.2 But these targets regularly conflict, as 
when streamlined articulation weakens perceptual con-
trasts or creates formal alternations that are harder to 
learn. In fact it has been a key insight of optimality 
theory (OT) that many competing factors need to be 
juggled, but that not all are equally potent and most can 
be “non-fatally violated.” The different weightings of 
these “constraints” generate a kaleidoscope of language-
specific configurations, and modelling their interaction 
has been a strong appeal of the OT program. But the con-
straints identified by OT are more fruitfully treated as the 
sorts of scalar processing effects sketched in Haspel-
math’s commentary. The typological sweep, like OT pho-
nology, aims at a comprehensive documentation of all such 
constraints and their interactions, finding languages in 
which individual effects can best be isolated or recom-
bined, with laboratory phonology studying why each 
effect occurs. 
The line of attack that “languages share structural simi-
larities often masked by one of their differences” 
(Pesetsky) thus misses the point of why it is useful to con-
front diversity head on. Like generative theory, the 
program we have outlined seeks to discover the general 
behind the particular. But it differs in where we seek the 
general laws. For our generativist critics, generality is to 
be found at the level of structural representation; for us, 
at the level of process. Our claim, in Darwinian mode, is 
that the unity of evolutionary mechanisms can best be dis-
cerned by reckoning with the full diversity of evolutionary 
products and processes. 
R2.5. Non-abstract representations preserve 
information 
Rizzi suggests that the typologist’s strategy of using an 
“extremely impoverished, non-abstract descriptive appar-
atus” that takes diversity at face value in representing 
phenomena will have less success than the generative 
program in establishing universal patterns. Yet, as the 
burden of explanation for cross-linguistic patterning is 
moved out of the prewired mind and into the evolution 
of individual language systems under selection from the 
sorts of factors outlined earlier, the most appropriate 
mathematical models employ stochastical and continuous 
methods rather than the discrete methods that have 
characterized the generative tradition (Pierrehumbert 
et al. 2000). And once we employ these methods, there 
are positive benefits in “directly measuring the variation, 
instead of reducing it” (Bickel 2009): any other strategy 
risks degrading the information on which the methods 
are based. 
Take the question of how perceptual discriminability 
and articulatory ease interact in the domain of vowel dis-
persion over the formant space to favor the emergence 
of some vowel systems over others. The classic study by 
Liljencrants and Lindblom (1972) simulated the evolution 
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of vowel systems over time under these twin selectional 
pressures and compared the results to the distribution of 
attested vowel inventories. The insights yielded by their 
model would not have been possible if the descriptions 
of vowel systems had been in terms of discrete binary fea-
tures such as [front] and [round] rather than in terms of 
position in a continuous three-dimensional space based 
on formant frequencies. 
Staying close to the surface thus avoids the essentializ-
ing fallacy critiqued by Goldberg and Croft, while retain-
ing the maximum information for matching against 
stochastic models of how general evolutionary processes 
interact to produce a scatter of different structural out-
comes across the language sample. 
R2.6. Neglect of “formal universals” 
We are criticized by Nevins for neglecting “formal univer-
sals” – “the analytic elements that human minds employ in 
constructing representations of sound structure . . . the 
available data structures (e.g., binary features, metrical 
grids, autosegmental tiers) and the possible operations 
on them that can be used in constructing a grammar of a 
language.” (See also our discussion in sect. R6.8 of Subja-
cency, as raised by Smolensky & Dupoux, Freidin, and 
Rizzi.) 
Data structures like these have undoubted value in con-
structing formal representations of phonological phenom-
ena. But, first, it does not follow that they are the actual 
representations that humans learn and use. As Tomasello 
and Bavin argue, increasingly powerful general pattern 
learning mechanisms suggest that many of the relevant 
phenomena can be managed without needing the rep-
resentations that Nevins advocates. Second, even if such 
structures prove to have psychological reality, it does not 
follow that we are natively endowed with them. Take the 
general issue of discrete combinatoriality – the fact that 
languages recombine discrete units like consonants and 
vowels – which is relevant both to binary features (like + 
consonantal) and, in many models, the separation of con-
sonantal and vocalic elements onto distinct autosegmental 
tiers.3 Zuidema and De Boer (2009) have used evolution-
ary game theory simulations to investigate the hypothesis 
that combinatorial phonology results from optimizing 
signal systems for perceptual distinctiveness. Selection 
for acoustic distinctiveness, defined in terms of the prob-
ability of confusion, leads along a path of increasing 
fitness from unstructured, holistic signals to structured 
signals that can be analyzed as combinatorial. Some very 
general assumptions – temporal structuring of signals 
and selection for acoustic distinctiveness – lead over 
time to the emergence of combinatorial signals from holis-
tic origins. 
Should linguists use binary features and autosegmental 
tiers in the grammars and phonological descriptions they 
write? Sure, whenever they are useful and elegant. Do 
we need them to draw on a single, universal feature set 
to account for the mental representations that speakers 
have? Probably not, judging by the direction in which 
the psycholinguistic learning literature is headed. Do we 
need them to account for why languages all exhibit dis-
crete combinatoriality? No – this can emerge through 
the sorts of processes that Zuidema and De Boer have 
modelled. Intriguingly, an empirical parallel has been 
identified in one new sign language: Meir et al. (in 
press) and Sandler et al. (2009) show that duality of pat-
terning has only been gradually emerging over three gen-
erations of one Bedouin sign language variety. 
R2.7. An underanalyzed Wunderkammer of variation 
A number of commentators charge us with producing a 
Wunderkammer of exotica (Pesetsky), intended more to 
dazzle rather than illuminate. Pesetsky and Tallerman 
suggest that if properly analyzed these exotica will turn 
out just to be ordinary, universal-conforming languages. 
Both take up the issue of constituency, and argue that 
recent research finds it subtly present in languages pre-
viously claimed to lack it. A clarification is in order. 
There are two potential issues: 
a. Is constituency universal in the sense that all 
languages exhibit it somewhere in their systems, if even 
marginally? 
b. Is constituency universal in the sense that all 
languages use it as the main organizational principle of 
sentence structure and the main way of signalling gramma-
tical relations? 
Our target was (b) – different languages use different 
mixes, as has been well-modelled by approaches like 
LFG; but our commentators tend to target (a). 
Pesetsky points out that Tlingit may after all have an 
initial slot into which constituents can be systematically 
shifted (we would need to know actually what can go 
there, and if that is actually predicted by a constituency 
analysis). But he is wrong in presenting Warlpiri as the 
“free word order language par excellence.” It is well 
known that Warlpiri places its auxiliary after the first con-
stituent, and that when words are grouped together into a 
contiguous NP only the last word needs to carry case, 
instead of the usual patterning of inflecting every word. 
Neither of these properties, however, are found in 
Jiwarli (Austin & Bresnan 1996), which is why we chose 
it as our example. 
The point about free word order languages, whether or 
not they have small islands of constituency, is that they 
cannot be parsed by a constituency-based algorithm as in 
most NLP (natural language programming) today, 
because they do not use constituency as the systematic 
organizing principle of sentence structure. If constituency 
is not the universal architecture for sentence structure, 
then the entire generative apparatus of c-command, 
bounding nodes, subjacency, and so forth collapses, 
since all are defined in terms of constituency. In this way 
Tallerman is wrong in thinking that parsing free word 
order is just like parsing English discontinuous construc-
tions – the latter are allowed by rule, which sets up 
precise expectations of what comes next in what order. 
Incidentally, the reader should note the argumentation 
of these rejoinders: that we, Evans & Levinson (E&L), 
have cherry-picked exotic facts about language A, but 
look, language B yields to the normal universal analysis, 
so there’s no reason to take A seriously. Since absolute uni-
versals can be falsified by a single counterexample, it is a 
logical fallacy to defend a universal by adducing facts 
from some other language which happens not to violate it. 
The seven general charges we have discussed capture, 
we think, most of the sources of disagreement. Freidin’s 
commentary in particular indicates the deep rift in 
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contemporary linguistics between Chomskyans and the 
rest, which ultimately rests on different judgements 
about the interlocking of theory and evidence. This is 
regrettable, as generative grammar has served to open 
up the “deep unconscious” of language as it were, 
showing how languages are organized with far greater 
complexity than had hitherto been imagined. While 
Chomskyans have presumed that these complexities 
must be innate, we have argued that there are two blind 
watchmakers: cultural evolution acting over deep time, 
and genetic infrastructure, which for the most part, of 
course, will not be specific to language. 
Finally, let us note that Chomsky’s own position makes 
it clear that the generative enterprise simply has a different 
target than the program we are trying to promote, namely, 
(in our case) working out the implications of language 
diversity for theories of cognition and human evolution. 
The following recent quote makes this clear: 
Complexity, variety, effects of historical accident, and so on, 
are overwhelmingly restricted to morphology and phonology, 
the mapping to the sensorimotor interface. That’s why these 
are virtually the only topics investigated in traditional linguis-
tics, or that enter into language teaching. They are idiosyncra-
sies, so are noticed, and have to be learned. If so, then it 
appears that language evolved, and is designed, primarily as 
an instrument of thought. Emergence of unbounded Merge 
in human evolutionary history provides what has been called 
a “language of thought,” an internal generative system that 
constructs thoughts of arbitrary richness and complexity, 
exploiting conceptual resources that are already available or 
may develop with the availability of structured expressions. 
(Chomsky 2007, p. 22; our emphasis) 
On this view, UG primarily constrains the “language of 
thought,” not the details of its external expression. The 
same conclusion was stoically reached by Newmeyer 
(2004, p. 545): “Typological generalizations are therefore 
phenomena whose explanation is not the task of gramma-
tical theory. If such a conclusion is correct, then the expla-
natory domain of Universal Grammar is considerably 
smaller than has been assumed in much work in the Prin-
ciples-and-Parameters approach” and Chomsky (2007, 
p. 18) seems in part to concur: “Diversity of language 
provides an upper bound on what may be attributed 
to UG.” 
These then are simply different enterprises – Chomsky 
is concerned with the nature of recursive thought 
capacities, whereas linguistic typology and the non-gen-
erative linguists are concerned with what external 
language behavior indicates about the nature of cognition 
and its evolution. We have argued that the latter program 
has more to offer cognitive science at this juncture in intel-
lectual history. Perhaps a mark of this is that our cross-
linguistic enterprise is actually close to Chomsky’s new 
position in some respects, locating recursion not as a uni-
versal property of (linguistic) syntax, but as a universal 
property of language use (pragmatics, or mind) – a fact, 
though, that emerges from empirical cross-linguistic work. 
R3. How much of the design space is populated? 
Pinker & Jackendoff point out no doubt correctly that 
the possible design space for human languages is much 
greater than the space actually explored by existing 
languages. Two basic questions arise: (1) What exactly 
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are the dimensions of the possible design space, of 
which just one corner is actually occupied? (2) What 
exactly does this sequestration in a small corner imply? 
Before we get too excited by (1), we should consider (2). 
Pinker & Jackendoff imply that languages are locked into 
the corner by intrinsic, innate constraints, and that’s why we 
don’t find languages with really outlandish properties. But 
there is a fundamental fact they have overlooked. The ear-
liest modern human remains date back to about 200,000 
BP, and outside Africa date from only 100,000 years or so 
ago. If that is the date of the great diaspora, there has 
been relatively little time for diversification. Let us explain. 
We have to presume that most likely all the languages 
we have now are descended by cultural evolution from a 
single ancestral tongue (it would take an event of total 
spoken language loss to be otherwise – not impossible, 
but requiring a highly unlikely scenario, such as an isolated 
lineage descended from a deaf couple). Now consider the 
following surprising fact. The structural properties of 
language change on a near-glacial time scale. In an 
ongoing study using Bayesian phylogenetics, Dunn et al. 
(in preparation) have found that taken individually, a 
structural feature within a single large language-family 
like Austronesian changes on average just once about 
every 50,000 years.4 What that implies is that all the 
languages we now sample from are within structural spit-
ting distance of the ancestral tongue! It is quite surprising 
in this light that typologists have been able to catalogue so 
much linguistic variation. Once again, a coevolutionary 
perspective is an essential corrective to the enterprise. 
So whether we need a lot of further explanation for the 
fact that languages seem to be cultivating the same garden 
(Tallerman), to the degree that this can be shown, 
depends crucially on the extent to which you think the 
languages of the world are independent experiments. 
Francis Galton, who stressed the need for genealogical 
independence in statistical sampling, would urge caution! 
Let us turn now to the properties of the design space. 
Pinker & Jackendoff point out that we set aside a rich 
set of functional universals on the grounds that they are 
definitional of language (a move we borrowed directly 
from Greenberg). Of course it is not trivial that these 
seem shared by all human groups (although very little 
empirical work has actually been done to establish this – 
but see, e.g., Stivers et al. 2009). We think that there is a 
clear biological infrastructure for language, which is 
distinct from the structural properties of language. This 
consists of two key elements: the vocal apparatus and the 
capacity for vocal learning, on the one hand (both biologi-
cal properties unique in our immediate biological family, 
the Hominidae), and a rich set of pragmatic universals 
(communicative intention recognition prime among 
them), on the other. This is the platform from which 
languages arise by cultural evolution, and yes, it limits 
the design space, like our general cognitive and learning 
capacities (Christiansen & Chater). We emphasized 
that those interested in the evolution of the biological pre-
conditions for language have been looking in the wrong 
place: Instead of looking at the input-output system (as 
Philip Lieberman has been urging for years; see, e.g., Lie-
berman 2006), or the pragmatics of communicative 
exchange, they’ve been focussed on the syntax and combi-
natorics, the least determined part of the system, as 
demonstrated by linguistic typology. 
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A functional perspective has been a long running under-
current in typological and descriptive linguistics, as Croft 
and Goldberg remind us. Goldberg suggests that the 
design space is highly constrained by systems motivations; 
for example, pressures to keep forms distinct while staying 
within the normal sound patterns of a language. These 
pressures provide explanations for the internal coherence 
of language structure, a perspective that is indeed necess-
ary to explain how languages are not for the most part a 
heap of flotsam and jetsam accumulated during cultural 
evolution, but rather, beautifully machined systems, with 
innovations constantly being adjusted to their functions. 
Returning to the question of how saturated or otherwise 
the design space is, Pinker & Jackendoff maintain it is 
easy to think of highly improbable but possible language 
types, and they suggest a few. Quite a few of these 
simply fail on the functional front – they are unproductive 
like their Cadda, or limited in expressiveness like their 
Bacca, and groups confined to speaking such languages 
would rapidly lose out to groups with more expressive 
systems. Daffa, the quantificational-logic language, lacks 
any form of deictics like “I,” “‘you,” “this,” “now,” or 
“here”: The presence of some deictics is certainly a func-
tional universal of human language and follows from the 
emergence of human language from interactional, socially 
situated transactions. 
Interestingly, though, some natural languages do have 
properties that partake of Pinker & Jackendoff’s 
thought experiments. For example, their imaginary 
Cadda, a language of one word holophrases, lacks 
double articulation. The three-generation sign language 
of Al Sayyid is also said to lack double articulation (Meir 
et al., in press; Sandler et al. 2009), showing that this has 
to arise by cultural evolution: it is not given by instinct. 
The musical language Gahha, likewise, isn’t too far off 
attested reality. The West Papuan language Iau (Bateman 
1986a; 1986b; 1990a; 1990b) has eight phonemic tones 
(including melodic contours), close to the number of pho-
nemic segments, and uses them both for lexical distinctions 
and for grammatical distinctions including aspect, mood, 
and speech-act distinctions; other tone languages use 
pitch to indicate modality or case (e.g., Maasai). 
Nor is the “rational” Fagga too far “outside the envelope.” 
Sure, it would require a level of semantic factorization down 
to a number of combinable semantic components not larger 
than the number of phonemes, but some semantic theories 
posit a few score “semantic primitives” in terms of which all 
meanings can be stated (e.g., Goddard & Wierzbicka 2002), 
and Demiin, the Lardil initiation language, maps the entire 
lexicon down to around 150 elements (Hale 1982). 
Combine Demiin semantics with !Xo´o˜  phonology (159 con-
sonant phonemes on some analyses), pair one semantic 
element to each phoneme, and Fagga might just squeak 
in.5 Whether or not it then actually existed would depend 
on whether a possibly evolutionary route past the “historical 
filters” could be found – in other words whether an evol-
utionary pathway could exist to reach this highly economical 
mapping of meaning elements onto phonological segments. 
Finally, it is salutary to recollect that it is only relatively 
recently that we have come to recognize sign languages as 
fully developed languages with equal expressive power to 
spoken languages. These languages with their easy access 
to iconicity and analog spatial coding break out of the 
design space restricted by the strictly linear coding of the 
vocal-auditory channel. The typology of these languages is 
still in development, and there are plenty of surprises yet 
to come (see Meir et al., in press; Zeshan 2006a; 2006b). 
R4. Language variation and the future directions 
of cognitive science 
R4.1. Is history bunk? Linguistics as a science of 
change 
History is more or less bunk. It’s tradition. We don’t want tradition. We 
want to live in the present and the only history that is worth a tinker’s 
dam is the history we make today. 
— Henry Ford (Interview in Chicago Tribune, May 25, 1916) 
Nevins’ dismissal of the coevolutionary approach we are 
advocating as “hand-waving at diachronic contingencies” 
hints at another kind of dissatisfaction with the general 
program we outlined in the target article: the suspicion 
that we advocate an old-fashioned historical and cultural 
approach, which will return linguistics wholly to the huma-
nities. The antipathy to history is based on the view that (a) 
it is the study of particularities, whereas we should be in 
the business of generalizing, (b) it cannot be predictive, 
while any empirical science should make falsifiable 
predictions. 
But the study of evolution is centrally about history, the 
study of the match between organisms and environment 
over time, and few would doubt its scientific credentials. 
And modern linguistics began as a historical discipline, 
that rapidly felt able to announce laws of historical 
change, while recent sociolinguistics has been able to 
catch language change in the making. 
A fundamental shift is that modern computational 
methods have revolutionized the possibility of studying 
change in systems using more and more complex and rea-
listic simulations. Within the study of evolution, compu-
tational cladistics exploits this to the full, using, for 
example, Bayesian inference to run millions of simulations 
and Monte Carlo Markov chains to search for the optimum 
model that predicts back the data with the greatest like-
lihood. We can make history today, as Henry Ford 
thought we should. 
In the coda of the target article (sect. 8) we sketched a 
set of future directions for the language sciences based 
on evolutionary ideas, and these new methods put 
those directions within our grasp right now. Take the 
idea stated in thesis (3), that recurrent clustering of sol-
utions will occur in grammars of non-closely related 
languages – such a claim can be tested by simulations. 
Equally tractable is the idea that changes cascade 
(thesis [4]), so that a few crucial ones may land a 
language in a gully of future developments. Thesis (5) 
about coevolution between brain, vocal organs, and 
language has already begun being intensively explored 
by simulation (Christiansen & Chater 2008; Christian 
et al. 2009). Thesis (7) suggests that we should investi-
gate how the full range of attested language systems 
could have arisen – pie in the sky without computational 
simulation, but now thinkable. For example, we could 
follow Bickerton (1981) and start with a simple Creole-
like language, described by a set of formal features or 
characters, and use the rates and parameters of charac-
ter change derived from recent work on the Bayesian 
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phylogenetics of language families to simulate cultural 
evolution over more than 100,000 years. Do we derive 
patterns of diversity like we now see, or would we 
need to model special historical circumstances such as 
massive hybridization? 
Smolensky & Dupoux ignore the recent synthesis of 
biological and cultural evolution. Thus they assert 
“language is more a biological than a cultural construct.” 
We would go further: “language is one hundred percent 
a biological phenomenon.” It is absurd to imagine that 
humans by means of culture have escaped the biosphere – 
we are just a species with a very highly developed 
“extended phenotype” or “niche construction” (Laland 
et al. 1999), using culture to create conditions favorable 
to our survival. The twin-track approach to human evol­
ution that we sketched (derivatively from, e.g., Boyd & 
Richerson 1985; Durham 1991) tries to explicate this, uni­
fying perspectives on history and phylogeny as the science 
of likely state changes in a population. There is immense 
room for future theoretical and modelling work here: 
without it we are not going to understand how we as a 
species evolved with the particular cognitive capacities 
we have. 
R4.2. Learning and development 
A number of commentators stress how two further 
avenues of research will help to situate our understanding 
of human cognition in a biological context: human devel­
opment, and comparative psychology across species. For 
reasons of space, and reflecting the limits of our own 
expertise, we underplayed the crucial role of learning 
and cognitive development that is presupposed by the 
linguistic variation we outlined. These commentators 
offer a valuable corrective, summarizing the human and 
cross-species literature. They show how much more 
powerful are the learning mechanisms we can now draw 
on than the basic associationist models available in the 
1950s when Chomsky argued that their lack of power 
forced us to postulate rich innate endowments for 
language learning. Indeed, the combined arguments put 
forth by the commentators go some way towards providing 
a solution to a problem we left unanswered at the end of 
section 7 of the target article: accounting for how language 
learning is possible in the face of the levels of diversity we 
describe. 
Bavin does a good job of reminding readers what the 
basic issues are here, and especially the central debate 
over the domain-specificity of language learning. 
Tomasello observes that the Chomskyan argument 
about the unlearnability of language structure crucially 
relies on the assumption of a simple association learning: 
once we take into account the rich context of communi­
cation, with shared attention and intention interpretation, 
not to mention capacities for analogy and statistical learn­
ing, the argument fails. Catania also refers to work on 
other species showing that category discrimination can 
be triggered right across the board by a single new stimu­
lus. Catania, Christiansen & Chater, and Merker all 
stress the funnelling effects of the learner bottleneck via 
“C-induction”: In Merker’s words. “cultural transmission 
delivers the restricted search space needed to enable 
language learning, not by constraining the form language 
takes on an innate basis, but by ensuring that the form 
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in which language is presented to the learner is learnable.” 
Catania suggests we explicitly incorporate a “third track” – 
acquisition – into our coevolutionary model, but we would 
prefer to maintain it as one (albeit powerful) set of selec­
tors on linguistic structure alongside the others we 
outline in our article. 
A number of commentators dwelt on Chomsky’s 
“poverty of the stimulus” argument for rich innate 
language capacities. Bavin points out that the complex 
sentential syntax that motivates the argument is learnt so 
late that the child has wide experience of language on 
which to build. Perhaps the neatest refutation is provided 
by Waterfall & Edelman, who note a crucial property of 
the linguistic input to children: namely, repetition with 
minor variation, which draws attention to the structural 
properties of strings, exhibiting for the infant the “trans­
formations” of Zellig Harris. They show how learning 
algorithms can effectively use this information to bootstrap 
from unsegmented text to grammatical analysis. 
McMurray & Wasserman correctly point out that our 
position radically moves the goal posts for language learn­
ing, suggesting that not only are a slew of specialized learn­
ing strategies employed to learn a language (and these 
commentators provide very useful bibliographic leads 
here), but which of these strategies is deployed may 
depend on the language being learnt. We don’t necessarily 
learn Ye´ lıˆ  Dnye with its 90 phonemes, flexible phrase 
order, and widespread verb suppletion using the same 
strategies we use for English: As McMurray & Wasserman 
write, “humans . . . assemble language with a variety of 
learning mechanisms and sources of information, this 
assembly being guided by the particularities of the 
language they are learning.” Instead of talking about the 
passive acquisition of language, we should be talking 
about the active construction of many different skills. 
This perspective buries the idea of a single language acqui­
sition device (LAD). 
Christiansen & Chater, as well as Catania, emphasize 
that learning in development is the crucial filter through 
which languages have to pass. Languages have to be 
good to think with (to modify an adage of Levi-Strauss), 
otherwise they won’t make it. Christiansen & Chater 
have described (both in their 2008 BBS article [see BBS 
31(5)] and in Christiansen et al. 2009) interesting model­
ling that shows that the learning filter must be largely 
language-independent, and thus that properties of learn­
ing are unlikely to have evolved specifically for language. 
This is a new kind of evidence against the position 
taken by Pinker & Jackendoff that language-specific 
learning principles must be involved in the acquisition of 
language. 
Finally, we would like to draw attention to one other 
crucial aspect of development, namely, the way in which 
the environment is known to modulate developmental 
timing in the underlying biology of organisms, so that phe-
notypic variation can be achieved from the same genotype 
(“phenotypic plasticity”), and conversely, phenotypic iden­
tity can be obtained from variant genotypes (“developmen­
tal buffering”). In the conclusion to our target article we 
drew attention to the extraordinary achievement that is 
culture – generating phenotypic difference where there 
is no genetic difference, and phenotypic identity where 
there is genetic difference. These issues have been much 
explored in the biological literature on epigenesis and 
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development (see West-Eberhard [2003] for a fascinating 
overview). 
R4.3. The comparative perspective across species 
Our other major omission, as some commentators noticed, 
is the lack of reference to the comparative psychology of 
other species. Margoliash & Nusbaum appeal to linguists 
and others interested in the evolution of language to “cast 
off the remaining intellectual shackles of linguistic specie-
sism” and take the findings of animal research more into 
account. They usefully remind us of the importance of the 
relationship between perceptual and motor skills. Merker 
notes how findings about complex learned birdsong can 
explain how a prelinguistic human adaptation for emanci-
pated song could provide a mechanism for sustaining and 
elaborating string transmission, even if this was timed 
before the full emergence of social cognition: it can be 
driven by the need to impress by elaborate vocal display 
even when not yet used to communicate meaning. 
Darwin (1871) had, of course, imagined that language 
evolved from song (see Fisher & Scharff 2009; Fitch 
2006, for an update). 
Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli (Penn et al.) point out that 
our demonstration of the variability in language, and the 
implication that there is no simple innate basis for it, has inter-
esting implications for a central issue in comparative psychol-
ogy: what exactly is the Rubicon which divides us from apes? 
If the crucial ingredient was a chance language gene or the 
genetic substrate for UG, it might be possible to argue that 
language alone is responsible for the sea-change in our cogni-
tion. But if there is no such magic bullet, then languages must 
be learnt by principles of general cognition, and the Rubicon 
must be constituted by more fundamental and more general 
differences in cognition. 
Penn et al. err, though, when they try to extend the 
argument to downplay Tomasello’s (2008) thesis that the 
crucial divide is the special assemblage of abilities that 
make up the pragmatic infrastructure for human language. 
Tomasello’s assemblage of specialized social cognition is 
precisely what we need to explain the genesis of language 
diversity – it provides a general platform both for 
language learning and for the elaboration of distinct 
systems. Still, bringing their point together with those by 
Margoliash & Nusbaum and Merker is a useful remin-
der that we need to account both for the emergence of pat-
terned form (where cross-species studies of sophisticated 
vocalizers must take on greater importance) and of 
productive meaning (where social cognition is likely to 
remain the main driver). 
Penn et al. see in our display of language variation 
more evidence for their identification of a major disconti-
nuity between apes and humans in the capacity for 
relational thought. If this capacity is not introduced by a 
single new evolved trait, human language, then the gulf 
is a feature of general cognition. But we note two 
caveats here: First, in our very nearest cousins (chimps 
and bonobos), there are pale shadows of relational think-
ing (Haun & Call 2009). Second, no one doubts the impor-
tance of language in delivering ready-made relational 
concepts (Gentner 2003). Beyond that, we probably 
agree about the facts, but might value them differently: 
Is 10% continuity with chimps a telling bit of continuity, 
or is 90% discontinuity a hopeless Rubicon? 
R5. Situating language and cognition in the 
biology of variation 
Science moves in new directions blown by winds of differ-
ent kinds – Kuhnian collapses, new technologies, new 
integrative insights, newly developing fields, funding 
biases, even boredom with old paradigms. We think it is 
pretty clear that for a mix of these reasons, the cognitive 
sciences are about to undergo a major upheaval. Classical 
cognitive science was based on a mechanistic analogy with 
a serial computational device, where serial algebraic algor-
ithms could represent models of the mind. A simplifying 
assumption was made at the outset: we need only charac-
terize one invariant system. That is, the human mind is 
essentially an invariant processing device, processing 
different content to be sure, but running the same basic 
algorithms regardless of its instantiations in different indi-
viduals with different experiences, different environments, 
and different languages (cf. Smolensky & Dupoux’s “a 
universal principle is a property true of all minds”). 
This view has taken a number of knocks in the last 
twenty years; for example, from the success of parallel 
computational models and the rise of the brain sciences. 
The brain sciences were at first harnessed to the classical 
enterprise, with invariance sought beneath individual vari-
ation in brain structure and function through selecting 
only right-handed or male subjects, pooling data, and nor-
malizing brains. But cognitive neuroscience has increas-
ingly broken free, and now the range of individual 
biological variation is a subject of interest in its own right. 
Pushing this development is genetics. It is now feasible to 
correlatebrain structure and function with scans across half a 
million single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) or genetic 
markers. We already know detailed facts about, for 
example, the alleles that favor better long-term memory 
(Papassotiropoulos et al. 2006), and we are well on the way 
to knowing something about the genetic bases of language 
(Fisher & Marcus 2006, Vernes et al. 2008). On the proces-
sing side, we know that about 8% of individuals have right-
lateralized language, that individuals differ markedly in the 
degree of language lateralization, and that on specific tasks 
about 10% of individuals may not show activation of the 
classic language areas at all (Mu¨ ller 2009). (True, most indi-
viduals will have circuitry special to language, as Pinker & 
Jackendoff remark, but that may be only because using 
language bundles specific mental tasks, and because adults 
have built the circuitry in extended development.) We 
even have preliminary evidence that gene pools with 
certain biases in allele distribution are more likely to 
harbour languages of specific sorts (Dediu & Ladd 2007). 
We are not dealing, then, with an invariant machine at all, 
but with a biological system whose evolution has relied on 
keeping variance in the gene pool. 
This research is going to revolutionize what we know 
about the mind and brain and how it works. By putting vari-
ation central, as the fuel of evolution, it will recast the 
language sciences. Some aspects of the language sciences 
are pre-adapted to the sea-change –sociolinguistics, dialec-
tology, historical linguistics, and typology – provided they 
can take the new mathematical methods on board. But 
we can look forward to the new psycholinguistics, centrally 
concerned with variation in human performance in the 
language domain both within and across language groups, 
and the new neurocognition of language which will 
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explore both the varying demands that different languages 
put on the neural circuitry and the way in which superficial 
phenotypic standardization is achieved by distinct under­
lying processing strategies in different individuals. 
In this context, renewed interest in the variation in 
human experience and expertise, in the cultural contexts 
of learning, and the diversity in our highest learned skill – 
language – is inevitable. For the cognitive and language 
sciences to engage with these developments, a first step is 
to take on board the lessons of those linguistic approaches 
that place variation and process at centre stage. Then the 
very diversity of languages becomes no longer an embar­
rassment but a serious scientific resource. That is the 
message we have been trying to convey. 
R6. Appendix: Disputed data and generalizations 
R6.1. Kayardild nominal tense 
The occurrence of tense on Kayardild nominals was cited 
by us as a counterexample to Pinker and Bloom’s (1990) 
claim that languages will not code tense on nominals. 
Baker’s commentary does not dispute this, but then 
tries to use it to establish an orthogonal issue, namely, 
his verb-object constraint (see sect. R.6.10). While it is 
true that in Kayardild, tense appears on objects rather 
than subjects, it is not hard to find other languages, such 
as Pitta-Pitta (Blake 1979), where it is the subject rather 
than the object that codes for tense – so the general 
phenomenon gives no succor to Baker’s hoped-for univer­
sal. Needless to say, all this only reinforces the fact that 
tense can occur on nominals. 
R6.2. Positionals and ideophones 
We noted in the target article that not only are the “big 
four” word classes (noun, verb, adjective, adverb) not 
wholly universal, but there were plenty of other word 
classes out there, including positionals and ideophones. 
We used the example of Mayan positionals. Pesetsky is 
right that Mayan positionals are classically defined as a 
root class, not a stem class, but the facts are actually 
more complex (see, e.g., Haviland 1994). Positionals 
have their own unique distribution at the stem level too, 
occurring, for example, in a special class of mensural clas­
sifiers (de Le´on 1988), body-part constructions (Haviland 
1988, p. 92) and color-plus-position constructions 
(Haviland, submitted). In any case, many languages from 
around the world (such as Ye´ lıˆ  Dnye; Levinson 2000) 
have positionals as a special word class with their own 
distinctive distributions. (See Ameka and Levinson 
[2007] for detailed examples and a typology.) 
Pesetsky similarly tries to undermine the status of ideo-
phones/expressives as a word class (the terms are more or 
less synonymous, but come from different linguistic 
descriptive traditions). He correctly notes that Osada 
(1992) does not discuss their syntax in Mundari, and this 
reflects a general neglect of their syntactic characteristics 
in linguistic descriptions, apart from simplistic characteriz­
ations of them as “syntactically unintegrated.” However, a 
careful discussion of the syntax of the functionally similar 
class of expressives in another Austroasiatic language, 
Semelai, can be found in Kruspe (2004): their syntactic 
distribution closely parallels that of direct speech 
complements. Likewise in Southern Sotho (Molotsi 
1993), ideophones pattern like complements of “say,” 
with the further property that they can be passivized, so 
that “John snatched the woman’s purse” is literally “John 
said snatch woman’s purse,” which can be passivized as 
“snatch was said woman’s purse.” In short, ideophones 
and expressives have a syntax, if sometimes limited. 
R6.3. Straits Salish noun versus verb distinction 
We pointed out that it was still unclear whether in fact 
there is a universal noun/verb distinction. We mentioned 
the Wakashan language Straits Salish as an example of a 
language plausibly claimed to lack a noun/verb distinc­
tion. Instead of presenting counteranalyses of the Straits 
Salish data, Tallerman cites data from Nuuchahnulth 
(Nootka), from another language family, with no demon­
stration that the arguments can be transferred to Straits 
Salish. A crucial difference between the languages is that 
names can be predicative in Straits Salish but not in 
Nootka. Tallerman’s major arguments for the existence 
of a noun/verb distinction in Nuuchahnulth were 
already given in Jacobsen (1979) and Schachter (1985), 
and Jelinek (1995) takes care to show that they don’t 
apply to Straits Salish, which is why we used Salish 
rather than Nootka as an example. We agree with her, 
though, that further investigation of the Salish case is 
needed (a point also articulated in Evans & Osada 2005); 
hence our statement that no definitive consensus has 
been reached. 
R6.4. Jemez/Kiowa number 
Harbour reproaches us for attributing the “unexpected 
number” facts to Jemez rather than Kiowa; in fact, the 
languages are related and both exhibit similar phenomena 
(Mithun 1999, p. 81, and personal communication). We 
thank Harbour for picking up the factual errors he 
points out, but for our part would like to correct his 
mischaracterization of this case as our “prime example” 
of “something we would never think of” – it was one of 
many, and the rest still stand. More importantly, further 
cross-linguistic data disputes his claim that “singular ‘we’ 
arises because Winnebago uses only [+ augmented].” 
The use of “because” here illustrates the fallacy of infer­
ring cause from single cases. Harbour’s formulation 
predicts that if a language uses a more elaborated gramma­
tical number system than just [+ augmented] it should not 
treat “1 þ 2” as singular. Yet there are many languages 
which have a three-way number system and which none-
theless treat 1þ2 in the same series as the singulars, like 
Bininj Gun-wok (Evans 2003a). 
R6.5. Arrernte syllable structure 
Nevins, and (briefly) Berent, take issue with our citing 
Arrernte as an example of a language that defies the “Uni-
versal CV preference” by taking VC as the underlying 
syllable type. To contextualize their riposte, it is worth 
quoting Hyman (2008, p. 13): 
In each of the above cases, there is no “knock-out argument.” 
Anyone determined to maintain [these] universals can con-
tinue to do so, the worst consequence being an indeterminate 
or more awkward analysis. . . . Architectural universals have 
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this property: it all depends on your model and on what com-
plications you are willing to live with. 
Nevins’ purported counter-analysis is of this type. To 
make it work is not just a matter of allowing onset-sensitive 
morae, not a problem in itself, but also of leaving the coda 
out of weight considerations, which is more problematic. 
Moreover, he only considers some of the phenomena 
that Breen and Pensalfini (1999) cite - such as the fact 
that the language game known as “Rabbit Talk” picks out 
exactly the VC syllable to move to the end of the word -
and ignores the arguments they give for postulating an 
initial vowel in words which start with a C when pro-
nounced in isolation; namely, that this vowel appears 
when the word is not pronounced breath-group initially, 
and that postulating it simplifies other morphonological 
processes. A further argument in favor of the VC analysis 
(see Evans 1995b) is that although there is considerable 
variation in how words are pronounced in isolation (e.g., 
“sits” can be pronounced [anama], [anam], [nama], or 
[nam]), the number of syllables remains constant under 
the VC syllable analysis (at 2 in this instance), whereas 
the number of syllables under other analyses remains 
inconstant, even with the moraic adjustments that Nevins 
proposes. In short, proposing VC syllables lines up beauti-
fully with a whole range of rules, whereas adopting the 
alternative, while workable, is crabbed by inelegancies. 
A deeper problem than mere inelegance in forcing a 
language like Arrernte into a procrustean CV bed is that 
it draws attention away from explaining what forces have 
shaped the unusual Arrernte structure. There is growing 
evidence from phonetic work by Butcher (2006) that the 
Arrernte VC syllable represents the phonologization of a 
whole syndrome of phonetic and phonological effects at 
work in Australian languages, linking a number of 
phenomena like: (a) the unusual proliferation of distinctive 
heterorganic clusters intervocalically (e.g., nk vs. r)k vs. Jik 
vs. n,k); (b) the large set of place contrasts for oral and 
nasal stops, including contrasts like alveolar versus postal-
veolar, that are most effectively cued by the leading rather 
than following vowel; (c) the neutralization of the apico-
alveolar versus apico-postalveolar contrast word-initially; 
and (d) the widespread pre-stopping of intervocalic 
nasals and laterals. 
The joint effect of all these features is to concentrate the 
maximum amount of contrasting information in intervoca-
lic position, and make the leading vowel crucial for signal-
ling the place of following consonants through F2 and F3 
formant transitions. In other words, it is VC rather than 
CV units (or, more accurately, the continuous phonetic 
signals that correspond to them) which are the most infor-
mative, in terms of cueing the greater number of contrasts. 
This now allows us to give an insightful account of why VC 
syllables emerge as phonological units in some Australian 
languages. We would not be led to this explanation if we 
use too much abstract representational machinery to 
conjure away the existence of an aberrant pattern. 
R6.6. Finite state grammars and cotton-top tamarins 
Pullum & Scholz pull us up for propagating a misinter-
pretation of the findings in Fitch and Hauser (2004), by 
stating that cotton-top tamarins have a general ability to 
learn finite state languages. We stand corrected, and urge 
the reader to heed Pullum & Scholz’s clarification that 
Fitch and Hauser’s findings are restricted to the much 
smaller subset known as SL (strictly local) languages. 
The investigation of recursive and augmentative struc-
tures in animal cognition is a current minor industry in 
cognitive science. If this is meant to shed light on the 
human language capacity, it is arguably quite misguided. 
Indefinite recursion, or discrete infinity as Chomsky 
prefers, is not an actual property of human language -
no human is capable of indefinite centre-embedding, for 
example. Only in the light of a radical distinction 
between competence and performance does this minor 
industry make any sense at all, and that little sense is 
undermined by the impossibility of testing animals directly 
for indefinite recursion. 
R6.7. Cinque’s generalization about Greenberg’s 
Universal #20 
Specifying strict ordering in noun phrases where the noun 
comes last, is raised by Rizzi as an example of how impli-
cational universals can be made to follow from parameter-
ized rules. However, Dryer (2009), drawing on a larger 
cross-linguistic sample, shows that you get better fit with 
the data if Cinque’s formal categories (like Adjective) are 
replaced by semantic categories (like “modifier denoting 
size, color, etc.”). Cinque’s parameterization just gives a 
discrete and approximate characterization of statistical 
trends reflecting the interaction of many functional 
selectors. 
R6.8. Subjacency and “invisible Wh-movement” 
A number of commentators (Smolensky & Dupoux , 
F re id in , Rizzi) appealed to the Chomskyan notion of 
“Subjacency” as a convincing example of a highly abstract 
principle or rule-constraint which is manifested directly in 
languages like English. The idea in a nutshell is that move-
ment of constituents is constrained so that they may not 
cross more than one “bounding node” in the syntactic 
tree (in English, bounding nodes are a NP, i.e., noun 
phrase, or a complementizer phrase headed by that). 
Hence you can say “What does John believe that Mary 
saw ?” but not “*What does John believe the rumor 
that Mary saw _?”. 
Now consider Rizzi’s point that many languages, 
including Chinese, do not move their Wh-words (so 
called in situ Wh) - they would stay in the corresponding 
slots indicated in the just provided sentences - but appear 
to exhibit semantic interpretations that might constitute a 
parallel phenomenon. The apparent lack of Wh-move-
ment in Chinese, which at first seems an embarrassment 
to the theory, is claimed however to mask covert movement 
at an underlying level, close to semantic interpretation: 
consequently the range of construals of a Chinese Wh-
question is argued to be limited by the very same abstract 
constraint postulated for languages with overt movement 
(see examples in Rizzi’s commentary). For generativists, 
this may seem like a double scoop: Not only is the con-
straint of an abstract enough kind that children would 
find it hard to learn in English, but it even holds in 
Chinese where it is, in effect, invisible, so could not poss-
ibly be learnt! Moreover, it is a completely arbitrary and 
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unmotivated constraint, so there is no apparent way for the 
child to infer its existence. Therefore, it must be part of 
UG, a quirk of our innate language organ. 
But this in fact is not at all a convincing example to the 
other camp. First, to make it work in languages with and 
without overt “movement,” it has to be so particularized 
(“parameterized”) for each language so that, as we noted 
in the target article, the child might as well learn the 
whole thing (Newmeyer 2005). Second, there are perfectly 
good alternative models that do not use movement: Wh-
words are simply generated in the right place from the 
start, using other methods than movement to get the 
correct logical interpretations. Within LFG, a combination 
of the FOCUS discourse function and prosodic structure 
can get in situ Wh interpretation with no covert movement 
required (Mycock 2006). Through methods like these, 
LFG, HPSG, and Role and Reference Grammar have all 
developed ways of modelling both the English syntactic 
constraints and the Chinese interpretation constraints 
without any covert operations or unlearnable constraints. 
Van Valin (1998) offers one of these rival explanations.6 
He notes that for entirely general purposes one needs to 
have a notion of “focus domain” – roughly the unit that 
can be focussed on as new information in a sentence. A 
chunk like Mary did X is such a unit, but the rumor that 
Mary did X is not, because it marks the information as 
already presumed. So it makes no sense to question part 
of it. Focus domains have a precise structural characteriz-
ation, and the informational structure of this kind explains 
both the English and the Chinese facts without positing 
covert entities or unmotivated rule constraints. Van Valin 
shows that the focus domains are easily learned by children 
from the range of possible yes/no question elliptical 
answers. This explanation needs the minimum equipment 
(a definition of focus domain) and no magic or UG. 
Take your pick between the two explanations – an 
unmotivated, unlearnable, hidden constraint implying 
innate complex architecture, or a general design for com-
munication requiring nothing you wouldn’t need for other 
explanatory purposes. As C.-R. Huang (1993) notes after 
discussing the Mandarin data, “there is no concrete evi-
dence for an abstract movement account . . . invoking 
Ockham’s razor would exclude movements at an abstract 
level.” 
R6.9. C-command 
Rizzi claims that “no language allows coreference between 
a pronoun and a NP when the pronoun c-commands the 
NP” (*He said that John was sick; *each other saw the 
men). We pointed out that in languages (like Jiwarli) 
which lack constituency as the main organizing principle 
of sentence structure, notions like c-command cannot be 
defined (c-command is defined in terms of a particular 
kind of position higher in a syntactic constituency tree). 
But let us interpret this relation loosely and charitably, 
in terms of some general notion of domination or 
control. Then the observation would have very wide val-
idity, but it would still be only a strong tendency. Counter-
examples include Abaza reciprocals (Hewitt 1979) where 
the verbal affix corresponding to “each other” occupies 
the subject rather than the object slot, and Guugu Yimid-
hirr pronominalization, where it is possible to have a 
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pronoun in the higher clause coreferential with a full NP 
in the lower clause (Levinson 1987). 
Once again, then, we are dealing with a widespread 
but not universal pattern. The typological/functional para-
digm explains it as emerging from a more general ten-
dency in discourse (not just syntax): reference to entities 
proceeds with increasing generality, which is why “She 
came in. Barbara sat down” is not a way of expressing 
“Barbara came in. She sat down.” (see Levinson [2000] 
for a detailed Gricean account). Many languages have 
grammaticalized the results of this more general tendency, 
producing grammatical rules which can then be described 
by c-command (if you want to use that formalism) but also 
by other formalisms. Seeking the most general explanation 
for cross-linguistic patterning here directs us to more 
general pragmatic principles (“use the least informative 
form compatible with ensuring successful reference 
given the current state of common ground”), rather than 
in terms of a specific syntactic constraint which only 
applies in a subset (even if a majority) of the world’s 
languages. Many strong tendencies across languages 
appear to have a pragmatic or functional base, undermin-
ing a presumption of innate syntax. 
R6.10. The “Verb-Object Constraint” 
Baker offers his “Verb-Object Constraint (VOC)” as a 
proposal for a “true linguistic universal” of this high level 
kind – the generalization that the verb “combines” with 
the theme/patient before a nominal that expresses the 
agent/cause (“combines” is not defined, so we take it 
loosely). But this, too, rapidly runs afoul of the cross-linguis-
tic facts. Note that his formulation equivocates between 
whether the constraint is formulated in terms of semantic 
roles such as agent and patient, or grammatical relations 
such as subject and object; some of the problems below 
pertain to one of these, some to the other, some to both: 
1. Many languages don’t have a clear notion of subject 
and object (see remarks in our target article). If we avoid 
this problem by stating the universal in terms of thematic 
roles (theme, patient, agent, experiencer), then we’ll find 
such anomalies as languages which effectively idiomatize 
the subject-verb combination, only combining secondarily 
with the patient, employing idioms like “headache strikes 
me/the girl” or “fever burns him” (Evans 2004; Pawley 
et al. 2000). 
2. Although polysynthetic languages like Mohawk 
usually incorporate objects rather than subjects into the 
verb, there are some that do incorporate transitive sub-
jects/agents (not just objects as Baker’s generalization 
would predict), most famously the Munda language Sora 
(Ramamurti 1931; cf. Anderson 2007). 
3. There are twice as many VSO languages as VOS 
languages, 14% versus 7%, respectively, in a worldwide 
sample by Dryer (2009), but only VOS languages seem 
likely to facilitate a “combination” of verb and object. 
4. Languages with ergative syntax group the object of 
transitives and the subject of intransitives as one type of 
entity, around which the syntax is organized (Baker 
notes this as a potential problem, but doesn’t offer the 
solution). 
Taken together, these problems make the VOC just one 
more observation that is certainly a statistical tendency, 
but which it is misleading to elevate to “universal” status. 
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N O T E S 
1. We use the term generative linguists to refer to linguists working 
specifically within frameworks deriving from the various theories of 
Chomsky. The term also has a wider sense, referring to a larger body of 
researchers working in fully explicit formal models of language such as 
LFG, HPSG, and their derivatives. These alternative theoretical develop­
ments have been much less wedded to the Chomskyan notion of Universal 
Grammar. LFG, in particular, has explicitly developed a much more flex­
ible multidimensional architecture allowing for both constituency and 
dependency relations as well as the direct representation of prosodic units. 
2. Of course these need to be relativized to modality: facts about the 
position of the larynx or the stability of some vowel formants across 
varying vocal tract configurations are only relevant to sound, whereas con­
straints on the production of hand or arm gestures are only relevant to 
manual sign. There will be some parallels, but the degree to which “sonor­
ity” is the same phenomenon in both, as Berent suggests, is still contro­
versial (Sandler 2009; Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006, p. 245). 
3. Hockett (1960) correctly identified this as part of the “duality of pat­
terning” (together with combinatorial semantics) necessary if language is 
to be unlimited in its productivity. 
4. Lest this finding invite incredulity, given that the language family is 
assumed to be less than 6,000 years old, this figure is worked out by 
summing independent path-lengths in many branches of the family 
tree and looking for the total numbers of changes from an ancestral 
language. The number should be taken with a pinch of salt but is probably 
in the right general ballpark. 
5. Abui, on Frantisˇek Kratochvil’s (2007) analysis, comes rather close. 
6. For other kinds of explanation in terms of processing costs, see 
Kluender (1992; 1998), Hawkins (1999), and Sag et al. (2007). 
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